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INTRODUCTION

The most noteworthy developments in criminal law in Tennessee in 1976-77' were effected by three decisions of the Tennes1. This survey encompasses state and federal decisions reported in the
National Reporter System during the calendar years 1976-77.
Occasional reference will be made to previous surveys, the complete citations for which are as follows: Cook, Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1975: A
Critical Survey, 43 TENN. L. REV. 535 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Survey];
Cook, Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1974: A Critical Survey, 42 TENN. L. REv.
187 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Survey]; Cook, Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1973: A Critical Survey, 41 TENN. L. REv. 203 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as 1973 Survey]; Cook, Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1972: A Critical Survey,
40 TENN. L. REv. 569 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Survey]; Cook, Criminal
Law in Tennessee in 1971: A Critical Survey, 39 TENN. L. REv. 247 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as 1971 Survey]; Cook, Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1970:
A Critical Survey, 38 TENN. L. REV. 182 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1970
Surveyl; Cook, Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1969-A Critical Survey, 37
TENN. L . RFv. 433 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Survey].
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see Supreme Court. In Graham v. State' the court adopted the
American Law Institute Model Penal Code test for insanity,' The
court held the Tennessee mandatory death penalty statute4 unconstitutional in Collins v. State5 and established guidelines for
the imposition of consecutive sentences following conviction of
multiple offenses in Gray v. State.'

II. OFFENSES
A.

Homicide

To sustain a conviction of first degree murder as a premeditated killing, "the cool purpose must be formed and the deliberate intention conceived in the mind of the accused, in the absence
of passion, to take the life of the person slain." 7 Not only must
there be time for premeditation, but premeditation must also
actually occur. The decision in State v. Bullington,l however,
would suggest that premeditation may be found in a sudden killing if there were sufficient time. Defendant and his uncle had
taken perhaps a dozen cans of beer to a deserted farm one afternoon and there by chance met a friend with whom they drank and
talked. In what was apparently a spontaneous transaction, defendant purchased a pistol from the friend." After shooting a few
beer cans, defendant placed the pistol and ammunition in his
pickup truck. Later, the victim rode by on his horse, and the
parties conversed in a friendly manner. At one point, defendant
asked to ride the horse, but the victim refused because the horse
2. 547 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1977).
3. See text accompanying notes 107-11 infra. The M'Naghten test had
previously been followed. See note 110 infra.
4. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2405 to 2406 (1975).
5. 550 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. 1977); see text accompanying notes 284-89 infra.
6. 538 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. 1976); see text accompanying notes 296-302
infra.
7. State v. Bullington, 532 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tenn. 1976).
8. Hemphill v. United States, 402 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1968); People v.
Caruso, 246 N.Y. 437, 159 N.E. 390 (1927).
9. 532 S.W.2d 556 (Tenn. 1976).
10. The apparent fortuity of the possession of a loaded pistol by the accused distinguishes the case from those in which the fact that the accused had
"gone armed" was itself some evidence of premeditation. See Belton v. United
States, 382 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (prior possession of weapon established
premeditation).
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was not completely broken. Defendant did not appear angered by
this refusal, and the four continued to drink beer and talk. The
conversation turned to politics, and defendant unexpectedly went
to the pickup truck and got the pistol. When the friend realized
something was wrong, he admonished defendant, "Don't do it."
The latter then said to the deceased, "If you don't tell me you are
going to vote, I am going to kill you." Deceased responded,
"Yeah, I'll vote," but defendant shot him twice anyway, causing
his death." The shooting was apparently a complete surprise to
both witnesses. There was no evidence of provocation on the part
of the victim, and he was not armed. The comments of defendant
prior to the shooting appeared quite irrational, yet the evidence
of intoxication was weak at best. No motive for the killing was
shown, although there was proof of an altercation a year or two
earlier between defendant and the victim in a beer tavern. The
court of criminal appeals had reduced the judgment from first to
second degree murder, apparently finding no premeditation, either because of insufficient proof or because of mitigation of the
offense by voluntary intoxication,'2 but the supreme court reinstated the judgment of the trial court. Notwithstanding the lack
of motive, 3 the supreme court found sufficient evidence in the
record to support the verdict, referring in particular to the absence of any provocation by the victim, the lack of any apparent
heat of passion in defendant, the fact that defendant walked
several feet to procure the pistol and returned before firing, and
the fact that two bullets were fired. As to the possibility that the
intoxication of defendant negated premeditation, the court held
that the evidence, while ambiguous, did not preponderate against
the verdict.
The absence of motive was once again acknowledged as im11. The defendant in Simpson v. State, 437 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1968), was convicted of second degree murder as the result of a similarly senseless killing. He confronted a man in a cafe and inquired, "Do you believe I'll
blow your brains out?" The man's negative response proved fatal. See 1969
Survey, supra note 1, at 436.

12. The opinion of the court of criminal appeals is unpublished.
13.

While proof of motive is not essential for a conviction of first degree

murder, 2 R.

ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE §§

194, 263

(1957), evidence of motive may be offered to establish the existence of premeditation. See generally People v. Sears, 2 Cal. 3d 188, 190, 465 P.2d 847, 853-54,
84 Cal. Rptr. 711, 717-18 (1970).
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material in State v. Johnson," although there the conviction had
been for second degree murder, and the issue before the court was
the sufficiency of proof of malice. In Johnson the right front of
defendant's car had struck the left rear of the victim's car. As a
result, the latter vehicle went out of control and crashed into
some gasoline pumps with the three occupants dying in the ensuing fire. A witness testified that defendant was tailgating the
victim's car and that both vehicles were traveling in excess of
ninety miles per hour at the time of the collision. Defendant
testified that earlier in the day he had had trouble with the
brakes on his vehicle. Once again the court of criminal appeals
found the evidence insufficient to support the verdict, apparently skeptical of the judgment of the trial court. 5 Citing a series
of cases in which malice had been implied in motor vehicle homicides based on a reckless disregard for human life," the court
concluded that the present case fell in the same category.
Tennessee courts have held repeatedly that in homicide cases
a presumption of malice arises from the use of a deadly weapon. 7
In Armes v. State'" the court of criminal appeals held that this
rule had not been constitutionally invalidated by In re Winship"
and Mullaney v. Wilbur.2 Winship required "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime."'"
In Mullaney the United States Supreme Court found a denial of
due process in a state rule that required a defendant charged with
murder to prove that he acted in the heat of passion in order to
reduce the offense to manslaughter. When the issue was properly
raised, the prosecution was required to carry the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, the absence of heat of passion.
The Tennessee court read Mullaney as only addressing "the issue
14. 541 S.W.2d 417 (Tenn. 1976).
15. The opinion of the court of criminal appeals is unpublished.
16. Staggs v. State, 210 Tenn. 175, 357 S.W.2d 52 (1962); Stallard v.
State, 209 Tenn. 313, 348 S.W.2d 489 (1961); Eager v. State, 205 Tenn. 156, 325
S.W.2d 815 (1959); Edwards v. State, 202 Tenn. 393, 304 S.W.2d 500 (1957).
17. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 210 Tenn. 63, 356 S.W,2d 405 (1962); Gann
v. State, 487 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972). See also cases cited in
1969 Survey, supra note 1, at 437.
18. 540 S.W.2d 279 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).
19. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
20. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
21. 397 U.S. at 364.
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of the erroneous use of presumptions when the effect is to shift
the burden of proof from the State to the defendant."2 In contrast, the Tennessee rule did not alter the prosecution's burden
of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Armes, the court concluded that the presumption employed was a "constitutionally permissible" presumption, comparable to the inference of guilty knowledge from presence at an
illegal still" and the inference of knowledge that the property is
stolen from the unexplained possession of recently stolen property. The crucial distinction would appear to be that the rule in
Mullaney created a conclusive presumption of malice, unless rebutted by defendant. The Tennessee rule, as expressed in the
instruction in this case, however, did not require defendant to
present rebutting evidence. The jury was left to determine on the
totality of evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense
whether the element of malice had been proved by the prosecution. This interpretation of Mullaney may be vindicated by
Patterson v. New York," decided after Armes, in which the
United States Supreme Court said that Mullaney "held that the
State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and that it may not shift the burden of proof to the
defendant by presuming that ingredient upon proof of the other
elements of the offense."'" In Patterson,the Court held Mullaney
inapplicable to the requirement that the defendant prove the
affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance by a preponderance of the evidence in order to reduce the charge to manslaughter.
In Armes reference was made by defendant in his brief to
another presumption in homicide cases: "When a deliberate killing is shown, the law presumes the existence of malice sufficient
to support a conviction of second degree murder, and . . . the
burden . . . is on the defendant to show mitigating facts and

circumstances sufficient to reduce the degree of homicide below
second degree murder." 7 The court acknowledged that such a
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

540 S.W.2d at 282.
United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
432 U.S. 197 (1977).
Id. at 215.
27. 540 S.W.2d at 284; see TENN. CoDE ANN. §§ 39-2401, -2403 (1975); 1972
Survey, supro note 1, at 570.
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presumption might be irreconcilable with Mullaney but concluded that the question was not raised by the instruction used
in this case.
B.

Sexual Offenses

The Tennessee Supreme Court followed the lead of the court
of criminal appeals" and the United States Supreme Court" in
holding cunnilingus encompassed by the "crime against nature"
statute 0 in Young v. State." The court found the statute as
construed constitutional, at least when applied to a forcible, nonconsensual act. The court explicitly avoided deciding whether the
statute could be enforced against married couples or consenting
adults."
In Wilkerson v. Benson" the court held that "[flornication,
committed in private, by consenting adults, is not a criminal
offense."'" Although fornication was not a crime at common law, 31
it might be prosecuted under the broader heading of "open and
28. Lundy v. State, 521 S.W.2d 591 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975); Locke v.
State, 501 S.W.2d 826 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973). Lundy and Locke involved
forcible nonconsensual acts.
29. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975).
30. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-707 (1975).
31. 531 S.W.2d 560 (Tenn. 1975).
32. Defendants may have relied on Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), in which the Supreme Court found that a statute effectively banning
contraceptives was an intolerable invasion of constitutionally protected privacy.
Lower courts have disagreed on the application of Griswold to sodomy
statutes. See Annot., 58 A.L.R.3d 636 (1973). Particularly noteworthy is Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425
U.S. 901 (1976), in which appellants, two self-professed male homosexuals, alleged that they were threatened with prosecution under the Virginia crime
against nature statute. They sought a declaratory judgment that the statute, as
applied to private, consensual homosexual activities, was unconstitutional as a
denial of due process, freedom of expression and privacy rights, and as imposing
cruel and unusual punishment. A divided three-judge district court upheld the
statute, and the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the decision. See Comment, Constitutional Law-Right of Privacy-Sodomy Statutes-Supreme
Court Summary Affirmance, 15 DuQ. L. REV. 123 (1976); Comment,
Constitutional Protection of Private Sexual Conduct Among Consenting Adults:
Another Look at Sodomy Statutes, 62 IowA L. REv. 568 (1976).
33. 542 S.W.2d 811 (Tenn. 1976).
34. Id. at 812.
35. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 13, § 676.
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notorious lewdness."" Such a common law offense has been recognized in Tennessee,37 and Wilherson reaffirms its existence.?
The contention that the statute prohibiting assault with intent to commit rape" was unconstitutional for reasons of sex discrimination was summarily dismissed in Lee v.State." The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals observed that "[t]he laws of
this state do protect males from sexual assault and abuse.""
While this may be true, it is hardly a sufficient response to a
charge of discrimination because the statute challenged by defendant in this case is designed for the protection of females only.
There is no equivalent statutory protection for males. To the
extent that defendant was arguing discriminatory protection of
potential victims, his argument could be dismissed for lack of
standing. While the statute might be attacked as mandating discriminatory prosecution, courts have consistently rejected this
contention on the ground that the discrimination is rationally
related to legitimate state objectives. 2
C.

Theft Offenses

1. Larceny
Larceny' requires proof of intent to steal at the time of the
taking.4' In Taylor u. State' defendant, an attorney, was hired to
collect a claim for about $70,000. The debtor wrote a check for
$7,250 in partial satisfaction, payable to defendant and the creditor, but told defendant that there would be insufficient funds to
cover the check for two weeks. The debtor testified that defen36. Id.
37. State v, Moore, 31 Tenn. (1 Swan) 93 (1851); Brooks v. State, 10Tenn.
(2 Yer.) 426 (1831).
38. "To make it a crime, it must have been attended with such circumstances as to give it publicity and notoriety." Wilkerson v. Benson, 542 S.W.2d
811, 812 (Tenn. 1976).
39. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-605 (1975).
40. 542 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).
41. Id. at 381.
42. State v. Kelley, Ill Ariz. 181, 526 P.2d 720 (1974); State v. Witt, 245
N.W.2d 612 (Minn. 1976); Stewart v. State, 534 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1975).
43. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4202 (1975).
44. Fields v. State, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 431 (1869).
45. 542 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).
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dant agreed to hold the check for that period; defendant denied
this understanding and in fact deposited the check in his trust
account on the same day. This account had been opened the
previous day with a deposit of about $400. Defendant immediately drew a check on the account for $7,350, which he deposited
in his account in another bank, and this deposit was used to cover
a previously drawn check that had been returned for insufficient
funds. When the original check reached the debtor's bank, the
debtor gave instructions to stop payment 6 The court concluded
that there was insufficient proof of an intent to steal, noting that
as the check was not postdated and the debt was due, defendant
was under no obligation to delay cashing the check.
It would appear equally true in Taylor that there was no
trespass in the taking, an element essential to a conviction for
larceny. 7 The trespass requirement was one of the issues raised
8
in Wright v. State."
The taking was in the form of shoplifting,
and defendant contended that if the goods were initially taken for
the invited purpose of examination for possible purchase, subsequent wrongful conversion could not justify a conviction for larceny since there was no trespass in the taking. The theory of the
defense was a legitimate one." The court held, however, that it
made no difference when the intent to convert the property was
formed: "The instant one determines to purloin the property the
conversion is complete and trespass has occurred.," ' To reach this
conclusion, it was necessary for the court to materially alter the
definition of larceny. At common law, as codified in the Tennessee larceny statute,5' the trespass and the taking were analytically
distinct elements, both of which must be proved by the prosecution.5 2 In Wright, however, the court made this novel statement:
"Actually, there is a redundancy in the elements of larceny in

46. The debtor did not deny that there were insufficient funds to cover the
check but stated that he had other debts to satisfy as well.
47. State v. Braden, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 67 (1805).
48. 549 S.W.2d 682 (Tenn. 1977).
49. "There must be a taking or caption sufficient to constitute a trespass."
2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 13, § 464, at 101 (1957).
50. 549 S.W.2d at 685.
51. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4202 (1975); see 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 431 (1869).
52. At common law, neither a trespass nor a taking constitutes larceny,
and takings are not inherently trespassory. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 13, § 464,
at 101-03 (1957).
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that the trespass is the taking and the taking is the trespass." 3
It would appear that the court was preoccupied with evaluating defendant's argument that the prosecution must prove an
intent to steal at the time of taking in a shoplifting case. The
concern is a legitimate one, but it is properly directed to the
interpretation of the shoplifting statute,5 4 not the larceny statute.
Indeed, it would appear to be a principal thrust of the defense
that defendant was convicted of the wrong crime. The court held
for the defense in concluding that shoplifting is a lesser included
offense of larceny and that the jury should have been instructed
as to this alternative. To reach this result, the court felt it necessary to demonstrate the substantial identity between the two
offenses: "It is evident that in any situation wherein the shoplifting statute is applicable, the elements of larceny and shoplifting
are all but identical; any difference is largely semantic." 5 Even
if the language of the statute is substantially similar, it does not
follow that the elements need be identically defined, nor is identity of elements necessary in order that shoplifting be a lesser
included offense.5 As noted, larceny is a common-law offense;
shoplifting is not. The shoplifting statute addresses a particular
type of theft with unique prosecutorial problems, and its elements should be construed consistently with this apparent legislative purpose. It does not follow, however, that to accomplish
this end, the court must reconceptualize common-law larceny.
The question of when a lesser included offense instruction
should be given also arose in Johnson v. State." Defendant, convicted of grand larceny, contended that the lesser included offense of petit larceny should have been included in the charge
because there was credible evidence that the property stolen had
a value of less than $100. The court agreed, holding that "if there
is any evidence which reasonable minds could accept as to any
such offenses, the accused is entitled to appropriate instructions.""5

53. 549 S.W.2d at 685.
54. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4235 (1975).
55. 549 S.W.2d at 685.
56. Voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter are lesser included offenses of murder. The distinctions are not merely matters of degree,
however. See Bartlett v. State, 1 Tenn. Crim. App. 60, 429 S.W.2d 131 (1968).
57. 531 S.W.2d 558 (Tenn. 1975).
58. Id. at 559.
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Finally, in two companion cases, the supreme court sought
to clarify the presumption arising from the possession of recently
stolen property. In Bush v. State" the court held that the presumption of theft was not destroyed by the presentation of contradicting evidence: "It remains to be weighed by the jury against
the evidence offered by defendant in explanation of his possession
of the recently stolen property.""0 The presumption, the court
reasoned, is based upon the probability that the possessor stole
the property. The fact of possession is inevitably accompanied by
facts, such as spatial and temporal proximity to the theft, that
increase or decrease the probability. A defendant might be entitled to a directed verdict if his explanation "so overcomes the
circumstantial force of the inference that there is insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction."'"
At the other extreme, however, the court repudiated prior
decisions 2 to the extent that they held that unexplained possession of recently stolen goods raised a conclusive presumption of
guilt. The court interpreted Barnes v. United States3 to prohibit
such a conclusive presumption as inimical to due process. The
court quoted the instruction given by the trial judge in Barnes4
59. 541 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. 1976).
60. Id. at 395.
61. Bush v. State, 541 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tenn. 1976).
62. See Peek v. State, 213 Tenn. 323, 375 S.W.2d 863 (1964); Cook v.
State, 84 Tenn. 461, 1 S.W. 254 (1886); Shaw v. State, 35 Tenn. 46, 3 Sneed 86
(1855).
63. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
64. Possession of recently stolen property, if not satisfactorily
explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which you may reasonably
draw the inference and find, in the light of the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that the person in possession
knew the property had been stolen.
However, you are never required to make this inference. It is the
exclusive province of the jury to determine whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any inference
which the law permits the jury to draw from the possession of recently
stolen property.
The term "recently" is a relative term and has no fixed meaning.
Whether property may be considered as recently stolen depends upon
the nature of the property, and all the facts and circumstances shown
by the evidence in the case. The longer the period of time since the theft
the more doubtful becomes the inference which may reasonably be
drawn from unexplained possession.
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as "a model for the framing of an appropriate instruction whether
the inferred fact is knowledge that the property had been stolen
or that the possessor was the thief."" The Barnes instruction was
employed in a case in which defendant did not testify. When the
defendant does offer an explanation,
the instruction should make it clear that the jury must determine both the correctness of the inference and the weight to be
given the explanation, that it is not bound to accept either and
that the burden of proving guilt of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt remains on the State."
In Turner u. State" the court held that while it recommended
the Barnes instruction as a model, it would not require a verbatim
recitation. Nevertheless, the language used by the court would
suggest that it expects trial courts to follow Barnes, and departures will be tolerated only when found "to be harmless error
beyond a reasonable doubt.""5
2.

False Pretenses

In State v. McDonald" the court considered whether reliance
upon the false representation by the victim was required to susIf you should find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in
the case that the mail described in the indictment was stolen, and that
while recently stolen the contents of said mail here, the four United
States Treasury checks, were in the possession of the defendant you
would ordinarily be justified in drawing from those facts the inference
that the contents were possessed by the accused with knowledge that
it was stolen property, unless such possession is explained by facts and
circumstances in this case which are in some way consistent with the
defendant's innocence.
In considering whether possession of recently stolen property has
been satisfactorily explained, you are reminded that in the exercise of
constitutional rights the accused need not take the witness stand and
testify.
Possession may be satisfactorily explained through other circumstances, other evidence, independent of any testimony of the accused.
Id. at 840 n.3.
65. Bush v. State, 541 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tenn. 1976).

66.
67.
68.
the Bush
69.

Id.
541 S.W.2d 308 (Tenn. 1976).
Id. at 402. The strictness of the holding is particularly significant since
decision, mandating the Barnes instruction, is a companion case.
534 S.W.2d 650 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 955 (1976).

19771

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

tain a conviction for obtaining property by false pretenses. 0 Defendant was charged with having obtained an unencumbered title
to an automobile, which was in fact encumbered by a lien, by
falsely representing to the county clerk that a lien in favor of a
credit union had been released. The victim of the offense was not
the county clerk, who relied upon the misrepresentation, but the
lien holder. The court held that the crime was proved "when the
person to whom the false representation is made . . . relies upon
the same to the ultimate detriment of the victim."'" This result
was reached notwithstanding the explicit statement in Beck v.
State" that reliance of the victim upon the representation was an
element of the crime." The court noted that the point was dictum
since the representation in Beck was made directly to the victim.
McDonald's interpretation of Beck seems incorrect, however,
since the conviction in Beck presumably would not have been
upheld if the representation had not been made to the victim.
The Tennessee false pretense statute codifies the common
law, and thus it would seem appropriate for the court to turn to
common-law sources in its construction. It is notable that the
court made no reference to any of the standard treatises, all of
which appear to define the crime as requiring reliance by the
victim. 7 A single Kentucky decision" was cited as precedential
support. The reason for the court's expansion of the scope of the
statute in McDonald was summed up in this statement: "It is
obvious that there must be reliance by someone, but in this modern day and age when fraud and deceit are practiced with sophistication and ingenuity a narrow construction such as this would
be tantamount to a judicial conference of the proverbial 'license
to steal.' "" Although the court has the power and, indeed, the
responsibility to modify the common law as changing conditions
warrant, it should not be overlooked that the present interpreta70. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1901 (1975).
71. 534 S.W.2d at 652.
72. 203 Tenn. 671, 315 S.W.2d 254 (1958).
73. The enumeration of elements in Beck was based on the holding of
State v. Morgan, 109 Tenn. 157, 69 S.W. 970 (1902).
74. See, e.g., 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 13, § 583, at 357; W. LAFAVE &
A. ScoT, CRIMINAL LAW 659-60 (1972); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 308-09 (2d ed.
1969).
75. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 167 Ky. 727, 181 S.W. 368 (1916).
76. 534 S.W.2d at 652.
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tion ignores not only all previous Tennessee decisions in which
the question has been addressed but also the overwhelming
weight of authority at common law. If it be granted that the
interpretation adopted is a desirable reconceptualization of the
offense, the fact remains that defendant was the victim of the
judicial equivalent of an ex post facto law." It would therefore
seem appropriate that the holding be afforded prospective application only. 8
D.

Arson

Under Tennessee statute, an individual who "counsels or
procures the burning of. . . any building" is guilty of arson and
punishable to the same extent as one who sets the fire.7 In State
v. Thompson,"' however, the court held that if the indictment
charged counseling or procuring, "it was incumbent upon the
State to establish that the accused did engage in such activity."'"
Presumably the conviction could not stand if the evidence
showed that defendant alone burned the building. In Thompson
proof of the offense was largely circumstantial. Defendant, with
the assistance of X, the person who actually set the fire, had
77. Cf. Keeler v, Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr.
481 (1970) (California Supreme Court unwilling to extend concept of "human
being" to encompass an unborn yet viable fetus for purposes of a homicide
charge). The Keeler court observed:
When a new penal statute is applied retrospectively to make punishable an act which was not criminal at the time it was performed, the
defendant has been given no advance notice consistent with due process. And precisely the same effect occurs when such an act is made
punishable under a preexisting statute but by means of an unforeseeable judicial enlargement thereof.
Id. at 634, 470 P.2d at 626, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 490 (emphasis in original).
78. See id. at 634-35, 470 P.2d at 626-27, 87 Cal. Rptr, at 490-91.
79. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39,501 (1975).
80. 549 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn, 1977).
81. Id. at 944.
82. In all felony cases, a material variance between the indictment and
evidence is fatal to a successful prosecution. See Brown v. State, 186 Tenn. 378,
210 S.W.2d 670 (1948); cf. Jenkins v. State, 163 Tenn. 635, 639, 45 S.W.2d 531,
532 (1932) (defendant indicted for burning a house but the state proved only
procurement: "[Olur statute includes two distinct offenses, viz. burning property and procuring another to burn it. If the prosecution conceives that the
accused procured another to burn the property, it should be so charged in the
indictment.").
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opened a women's clothing store, which was in financial difficulty. Evidence was inconclusive as to whether the fire originated
on defendant's premises, although one witness testified to having
heard a muffled explosion and observed flames coming from the
rear of the store. The following day a piece of carpet soaked in
gasoline was found near a back door to the premises, and a cross
bar used to secure the door was found on the floor rather than in
its proper place. There was testimony indicating that defendant
had an opportunity to unfasten the door while alone some twenty
minutes prior to the time the fire broke out. Immediately following the explosion, a car was observed speeding from the scene,
and that evening defendant went to see X at his home." A few
days later, a substantial portion of the inventory of the store was
found secreted on premises used by X. On the basis of this combined evidence, the court concluded that the jury was justified in
finding defendant guilty of counseling and procuring the burning
of the building.
E. Public Offenses
1. Obscenity
In Taylor v. State ex rel. Kirkpatrick4 the Tennessee obscenity statute 5 was sustained against a constitutional challenge
grounded upon vagueness and a lack of scienter. The statute was
upheld despite its combination of civil and criminal sanctions. In
EasternAmusement, Inc. v. State ex rel. Gay" the court held that
the "sworn detailed petition" required by statute7 for the issuance of a temporary injunction did not require that a film be
viewed in its entirety nor that a description of every scene be
included.8
83. The court used the phrase "counseled" with X, suggesting the language of the statute, and found it significant that X was not called as a witness
by the defense. 549 S.W.2d at 947.
84. 529 S.W.2d 692 (Tenn. 1975).
85. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3010 to 3022 (Supp. 1976).
86. 548 S.W.2d 876 (Tenn. 1977).

87.

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 39-3019 (1975).

88. No final determination of obscenity is based upon such affidavits and petition alone; neither is further exhibition of the film restrained upon such evidence alone. The petition and supporting affidavits merely furnish the basis for (1) issuing a temporary restraining
order preserving the films, (2) setting a show cause hearing to deter-
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Disturbing the Peace

Application of the disturbing the peace statute" arose in
Garvey v. State. The accused drove past the police station and
called to the arresting officer, "Sooey." No one other than the
accused and the officer was present. The accused contended that
the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction and that
the offense could only be committed by violent conduct or
"conduct calculated to provoke violence or a violation of the
law."' The court concluded that the statute did embrace language that took the form of "fighting words"' 2 but agreed that the
conduct of the accused was insufficient to sustain the conviction.'
3.

Drug Offenses

The Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971"1 excepts from its
criminal sanctions a substance possessed pursuant to a "valid
prescription.""' In State v. Sanderson" defendant requested a
practicing physician to issue a prescription for diet pills for her
sister who was visiting from out of town. Although the sister,
whom he never saw, was not a patient of the doctor, the prescription was issued and filled by a pharmacist. Later, defendant delivered the tablets that she had obtained to the operator of a
tavern. They were recovered by the police in a subsequent raid.
The testimony of the physician was to the effect that he wrote
mine whether a temporary injunction restraining further exhibition is
to issue and (3) issuing a summons requiring defendant to answer. For
this purpose, the petition and affidavits need only to furnish probable
cause for believing that the subject film is legally obscene.
548 S.W.2d at 877.
89. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1213 (1975).
90. 537 S.W.2d 709 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).
91. This is the language of the statute.
92. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
93. "There was no direct, face-to-face conduct or other exigent circumstances here. The word addressed to a police officer trained to exercise a higher
degree of restraint than the average citizen would not be expected to cause a
breach of the peace," Garvey v. State, 537 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1975).
94. TENN. CODr ANN. §§ 52-1408 to 1448 (1977).
95, Id. § 52-1432(b).
96. 550 S.W.2d 236 (Tenn. 1977).
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thirty or forty such prescriptions a month, without ever seeing the
individual requesting them. The court noted statutory authority 7
for the termination of the right to practice of a physician who
improperly prescribes drugs."
The malfeasance of the physician, however, did not excuse
defendant, who acted in bad faith. She had represented that her
sister had a weight problem, when in reality "she was what we
would commonly call 'skinny' and certainly had no legitimate use
for diet pills." 9 The tablets never came into the possession of the
sister but were delivered to a third party with the label removed.
"This was a clear indication that they were procured by fraud and
were never designed for any legitimate purpose. ' ' '
The court concluded that the legislative intent of the "valid
prescription" exception was "to provide a complete defense in
those cases where the prescription was issued in good faith."' So
worded, the holding appears more pertinent to the mens rea of the
issuer of the prescription than to the recipient. Certainly, the
physician might act in good faith while the patient acted in bad
faith-as, for example, when a patient diagnosed by the physician to be in need of diet pills, obtained them through a prescription, at all times intending not to consume them but to peddle
them in illegal drug trade. Under these circumstances, the physician would be exonerated of wrongdoing, absent any reason to be
suspicious. The person obtaining the prescription, however,
would not be exonerated, as the court makes clear in its holding.'12
Nevertheless, there remains some linguistic discomfort in the
conclusion that a prescription is "valid" insofar as the issuing
physician and filling pharmacist are concerned, but not insofar
as the person obtaining the prescription and receiving the drug.
97. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-618 (1976).
98. "It is the clear intent of the Drug Control Act that a prescription for a
controlled substance is lawful only if issued for a legitimate medical purpose.
This prescription was not so issued." 550 S.W.2d at 237,
99. Id. at 237-38,
100. Id. at 238.
101. Id.
102. "[W~e do not believe the legislature had any intention of placing a
protective cloak around anyone who procures a prescription with no intent to
deliver it to the ultimate consumer or who procures it by fraud, misrepresentation or deceit." Id.
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A "valid prescription" would appear to call for an appraisal of the
document, rather than the mens rea of the holder."' Apparently
sensing this incongruity, the court, while sustaining the conviction, suggested that defendant could have been convicted under
another section of the Drug Control Act, which made it unlawful
for a person knowingly and intentionally "to obtain possession of
a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception or subterfuge.1414

III.

DEFENSES

In Graham v. State"" Tennessee joined the growing list of
jurisdictions"' that have adopted the American Law Institute
Model Penal Code test for insanity:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the
time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not include any abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.""
While declining to adopt particularized jury charges, the court
cited excerpts from several federal cases"'" for the guidance of trial
103. This view was expressed by Justice Brock in a concurring opinion. He
preferred to place emphasis on the words "pursuant to" as used in the statute:
I would hold that the words "pursuant to a valid prescription" authorize possession only by the patient named in the prescription as the
intended ultimate user or by the duly authorized agent of such patient
who, in possessing the substance is carrying out the purpose of the
prescription, e.g., a relative or friend of a patient who takes a valid
prescription to a pharmacy, obtains the medication and takes it home
to the patient.
Id. at 240 (emphasis in original).
104. TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-1436(a) (1977).
105. 547 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1977).
106. For a list of federal and state courts that have adopted this test as of
1975, see G. MORRIS, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIVE
REFORM 89, 97-126 (1975).
107. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).

108. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United
States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 727 (6th Cir. 1968); Wion v. United States, 325
F.2d 420, 430 (10th Cir. 1963).
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judges. The court confessed that it found little to distinguish the
Model Penal Code test from the M'Naghten"l ' rules previously
followed, "', although it concluded the former would be more easily
understood by the jury. The holding was given prospective application, even as to cases in which the issue was raised and conviction had not become final prior to the release of the opinion.
In Edwards v. State"' the accused objected to the refusal of
the trial court to charge the jury on the statutes regarding the
hospitalization of individuals found to be mentally ill."' The
court observed that such information was not relevant to the
determination of guilt and agreed with the trial judge that given
the number of options available, any instruction would be highly
conjectural. Moreover, the statute authorizing commitment of
individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity' 31 merely vested
in the district attorney general the discretionary power to initiate
proceedings for hospitalization. The fact that the accused has
necessarily been found presently competent to stand trial and is
pleading insanity at the time of the act charged raises an additional complication regarding his ultimate disposition. The court
concluded that the accused had not been prejudiced by the denial
of the instruction.
In Graham the court for no apparent reason returned to the
discretionary commitment statute. In an extraordinary passage,
the court recommended that the legislature amend the statute to
authorize the trial judge to commit the individual for institutional care, irrespective of the preference of the prosecutor."
109. The rules are derived from M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
110. 547 S.W.2d at 543. "The new rule, however, does spell out the specifics of volition and the individual capacity to control his conduct. These elements
inhered in the M'Naghten Rules, but it is evident that they were not applied."

Id.
111. 540 S.W.2d 641 (Tenn. 1976).
112. While most jurisdictions agree with the court's position, a few jurisdictions, notably the District of Columbia, hold that such a charge is mandatory. See Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 737 (1967).
113. TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-709 (1977).

114.

The court cited

TENN. CRIM. CODE AND CODE OF CRIM. P.

§ 40-2321

(Proposed Final Draft 1973), which provides:
Criminal commitment.-(a) If a defendant charged with an offense
enumerated in subsection (b) is found not guilty by reason of insanity,
the court shall order him to be committed to the custody of the commissioner of mental health to be placed in an appropriate institution for
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When the evidence raises a reasonable doubt regarding the
sanity of the accused, the burden of proof shifts to the state to
prove that the accused was sane at the time of the offense
charged." ' The burden can be satisfied with either expert or lay
testimony, "6 and the jury is not required to give preference to the
7
former."1
IV. PROCEDURE
A.

Arrest

1. Temporary Detention
The use of "profiles" to identify individuals falling within a
suspect classification was subjected to constitutional scrutiny in
a number of cases in which this practice was employed to deter
airplane hijacking and terrorism. While abuses occasionally occurred, courts have generally found nothing constitutionally impermissible in the use of such methods as a basis for a temporary
detention not amounting to an arrest."' The issue rarely arises
now that common practice requires all individuals entering the
boarding area to submit to a search of their person and possessions. In United States v. McCaleb,"9 however, Drug Enforcement Administration agents used a "drug courier profile" in an
attempt to curtail narcotics traffic at a metropolitan airport. The
characteristics included in the profile were "(1) the use of small
denomination currency for ticket purchases; (2) travel to and
from major drug import centers, especially for short periods of
time; (3) the absence of luggage or use of empty suitcases; (4)
custody, care and treatment.
(b) Proceedings under this subchapter shall be applicable only to
defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity of committing:
(1) an offense under title 39, chapters 11-18, as amended; or
(2) under title 39, chapter 9, as amended, conspiracy, solicitation, or an attempt to commit any offense in title 39, chapters 11-18,
as amended.
115. Graham v, State, 547 S.W.2d 531, 544 (Tenn. 1977); Edwards v.
State, 540 S.W,2d 641, 646 (Tenn.1976).
116. Edwards v. State, 540 S.W.2d 641, 646 (Tenn. 1976).
117. Id. at 647.
118. See United States v.Riggs, 474 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 820 (1973); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972).
119. 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977).
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nervousness, and; (5) use of an alias. ' '2
The suspects in the present case were stopped because two
of the three were observed to be nervous, they had returned from
Los Angeles following a short visit, and they had only one suitcase. The court held that while the existence of certain profile
characteristics might constitute reasonable suspicion, the observations here were equally consistent with innocent behavior, and
the detention was therefore unreasonable. Furthermore, even if
the detention were found to be a reasonable Terry stop,' once the
suspects were taken to a private office and were not free to leave,
the detention had become an arrest,' 2 for which there was no
probable cause.
2.

Probable Cause

The determination of probable cause to arrest frequently requires a judgment as to the total import of a series of interrelated
but independently nonincriminating facts. Generally acknowledged as the weakest showing of probable cause of this type sustained by the Supreme Court is Draper v. United States,'n in
which the appearance of a suspect at a train depot as predicted
by an informant was found to confirm sufficiently the.report that
he would be carrying heroin.'
In United States v. Jackson' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was confronted with facts in many
ways comparable to Draper but found the case distinguishable
and probable cause lacking. 2 ' A companion of the accused was
arrested for possession of narcotics and provided the authorities
with information that the accused would be meeting him at the
Cincinnati Greyhound bus station at noon on a particular day
and that she would deliver to him fourteen ounces of heroin. He
120. id at 719-20. "During the time period of the instant arrests, this
profile was not written down, nor was it made clear to agents exactly how many
or what combination of the characteristics needed to be present in order to
justify an investigative stop or an arrest." Id. at 720.
121. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
122. See Manning v. Jarnigan, 501 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1974).
123. 358 U.S. 307 (1957).
124. For criticism of Draper, see J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED: PRETRIAL RIGHTS 122-24 (1972).
125. 553 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1976).
126. See also United States v. Mayes, 532 F.2d 729 (6th Cir. 1977).
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also provided a physical description of the accused. A person
meeting the description appeared at the proper time and place,
and officers followed her and the companion to a hotel. The accused was about to enter a room in the hotel when she observed
two of the officers peering around the corner of the hallway. As
she and the companion attempted to leave the area, she was
arrested."'
As in Draper, at the time of the arrest of the accused, the only
information linking her with illegal activity had come from an
informant. Unlike Draper,however, the informant was not shown
to be of established reliability. An officer testified that the informant had told him "other things" that had been accurate but
offered no further explanation. Unquestionably, this is insufficient to establish reliability. 2 ' The skepticism of the court was
also influenced by the fact that over a month had elapsed from
the arrest of the companion until the arrest of the accused, during
which time the companion was at liberty and, so far as the officers
knew, was once more engaged in drug trafficking. Moreover, while
the confirming observations in both Draper and Jackson were of
ostensibly innocent behavior, the court found the information in
Draper far more detailed. Granting that this is true, it may be
immaterial. Presumably, the purpose served by a detailed description of the suspect is to avoid ambiguity of identification.
While the informant in Jackson supplied fewer details, those details would appear to be sufficient to avoid mistake. Moreover, if
there were any doubt, the informant met the suspect in the bus
station in view of the officers-an act tantamount to pointing her
out. In Draper,the officers had been without the assistance of the
informant at the time of the arrest.
The more viable consideration in distinguishing Draper
would therefore appear to be the matter of informant reliability.
In this regard, the court in Jackson turned to a more recent decision, United States v. Harris,' which, albeit in a plurality opinion, discussed other factors in assessing informant reliability.
First, Harris suggested that the prior reputation of the suspect
127. A search of the room was found unreasonable, independent of the
illegality of the arrest, under the authority of Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30
(1970).
128.

129.

See .. CooK, supra note 124, § 20.

403 U.S. 573 (1971).

19771

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

could be taken into account in evaluating the credibility of the
informant's tip. In Jackson, however, the officer had no knowledge of the suspect's reputation in illicit drug trade. Second, the
plurality in Harris placed a premium on a tip based on recent,
first-hand observations, which were once again absent in this
case. Finally, the Harris plurality noted that reliability is enhanced if the statements to the police are against the penal interests of the informant. In Jackson the court concluded simply that
the informant did not make a comparable declaration against his
130
penal interest.
3.

Use of Deadly Force

The Tennessee statute permitting the use of deadly force to
effect a felony arrest 3 ' was held constitutional in Wiley u. Memphis Police Department.'32 Although the statute had previously
been sustained against constitutional challenge in federal
courts,13 the court apparently felt obliged to address the issue
once more in light of the decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Mattis v. Schnarr,'3' declaring
a similar Missouri statute unconstitutional. Beginning with the
premise that life is a fundamental right,' 5 the court in Mattis
reasoned that any deprivation of life called for some semblance
of due process.13' Thus, to sustain a statute permitting the use of
deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felon, the state "must demonstrate the existence of an interest equivalent to, or greater than,
130. The reason for this conclusion is not entirely clear. The informant
had confessed his intention to purchase fourteen ounces of heroin. If nothing
else, there was a conspiracy between him and the accused. The court is apparently saying that given the circumstances there was no danger of the informant
being prosecuted for the matter in respect to which he provided information.
The court noted that in fact he was not prosecuted. The difficulty with this
explanation is that it is true in virtually all cases of statements against penal
interest.
131. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-808 (1975).
132. 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1977).
133. See Beech v. Melancon, 465 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1114 (1973); Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D.Tenn.
1971).
134. 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976).
135. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973); Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
136. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976).
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the right. to life to justify the use of deadly force against fleeing
felons.11t : 7 The court found that the statute created a conclusive
presumption that all fleeing felons posed a danger to the pursuing
officers and the public, a presumption that was not confirmed by
the case before the court and that was not otherwise shown to be
accurate by empirical data.'" In holding the statute unconstitutional, the court said that the use of deadly force in law enforcement must be limited to (1) the arrest on a warrant or with
probable cause of an individual who has used deadly force in the
perpetration of' a felony and who cannot otherwise be apprehended and (2) circumstances giving rise to the reasonable belief
that the felon would use deadly force against the officer or others
if not immediately apprehended.
The Wiley court found little to commend in Mattis, observing that Mattis was the only decision holding such a statute unconstitutional.1 "' In particular, Wiley viewed as unrealistic the
expectation that law enforcement officers could make the on-thespot constitutional analysis called for by the holding.
While it is a popular criticism of decisions affecting law enforcement to say that law enforcement officers cannot be expected to be constitutional lawyers, the contention rings hollow
in this case. The arresting officer is not being asked to make a
sophisticated constitutional judgment, such as whether a particular set of facts establishes probable cause. ' To fall within the
first Mattis category, the arresting officer (a) must have probable
137. 547 F.2d at 1019.
1:;8. We find nothing in this record, in the briefs of the parties or
of the Attorney General, in scholarly literature, in the reports of distinguished study commissions, or in the experience of the nation's law
enforcement agencies, to support the contention of the state that statutes as broad as these deter crime, insure public safety or protect life.
Felonies are infinite in their complexity, ranging from the violent to the
victimless. The police officer cannot be constitutionally vested with the
power and authority to kill any and all escaping felons, including the
thief who steals an ear of corn, as well as one who kills and ravishes at
will.
Id at 1019-20.
129. Several jurisdictions have sustained similar statutes, See Hilton v.
State, 348 A.2d 242 (Me. 1975); Ford v,State, 538 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1977). See
abs State v. Young, 15 Wash. App. 581, 550 P.2d 689 (1976).
140. This will always be an issue in the case of a warrantless arrest, but it
is not a new obligation imposed by the Mattis holding.
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cause, with or without a warrant, to believe the individual has
perpetrated a felony using deadly force, and (b) there must be no
alternative means of apprehension. The latter requirement has
always been a requirement at common law.' The former merely
limits use of deadly force by law enforcement officers to situations
involving violent crimes. It is reasonable to assume that the arresting officer can virtually always satisfy the former requirement; otherwise it is unlikely he even has probable cause. As for
the second Mattis category, it would not appear too demanding
for the officer to have a mere reasonable belief that the felon will
use deadly force if not immediately apprehended. This limitation
simply presumes that if deadly force were not employed in the
felony, some additional evidence of danger must appear before
taking the life of the felon is reasonable. The Wiley court, after
rhetorically musing over how the officer could ever know for sure,
proceeded to explain why in this case the use of force would be
justified under the second Mattis category. Even assuming the
practical vulnerability of the Mattis test, however, the strongest
criticism of the Wiley decision is found in the fact that the court,
having chosen to confront Mattis directly, offered absolutely no
rebuttal to the constitutional theory sustaining that decision.'42
4.

Fruit of Illegality

A confession that is the fruit of an illegal arrest or detention
is inadmissible in evidence as a violation of the fourth amendment.'41 In State v. Chandler 4' defendants were illegally arrested
on a cattle theft charge, given the Miranda warnings, and incarcerated. Three days later, without a renewal of the Miranda
warnings, an officer approached one of the defendants in his cell
and asked him if he wanted to show them where he sold the
cattle. Defendant responded, "Sure," and accompanied three
141. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOrT, CRIMINAL LAW 402-04 (1972).
142. The closest the court came was a quotation from the dissenting opinion in Mattis: "There is no constitutional right to commit felonious offenses.
There is no constitutional right to flee from officers lawfully exercising their
authority in apprehending fleeing felons." 548 F.2d at 1253. This passage could
be used to justify the abrogation of any and all constitutional rights of those
.charged with felonies.
143. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963). See generally J. COOK, supra note 124, § 25.
144. 547 S.W.2d 918 (Tenn. 1977).

TENNESSEE LAW REVEW

[Vol. 45

officers to the site, The day after the arrest, the other defendant
was confronted in his cell by an officer who noted his limp and
suggested that an injury on his leg looked as if he had been
kicked by a cow. Defendant responded in the affirmative. Defendants objected to the admissibility of evidence relating these
two events.
In its first application of Brown v. Illinois, 45 the court delineated four factors to be considered in determining if an incriminating statement is the fruit of an illegal arrest: (1) the absence of
Miranda warnings; (2) the time lapse between the arrest and the
confession; (3) the presence of intervening events, such as an
arraignment; and (4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official
conduct. It would appear that the first three factors, which the
court failed to address, inure to the benefit of defendants. As for
the fourth factor, the court concluded that the utterances of the
defendants were spontaneous and that there was an absence of
evidence that the officers intended to coerce the statements. The
evidence was therefore found admissible and the convictions affirmed.
Justice Henry, dissenting, while agreeing with the court's
interpretation of Brown, disagreed with its application to this
case. He found the prolonged period of illegal confinement inherently coercive, irrespective of exploitation by officials. 4 ' Justice
Henry felt that the conduct of the officers not only violated constitutional rights but statutory rights as well.147 He viewed the
145. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
146. Quoting Miranda, Justice Henry observed that "the defendants were
subjected to 'the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.' " 547 S.W.2d
at 924 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966)). The observation
raises the question of why the court did not approach the case as raising a
Miranda issue as well as a Brown issue. Obviously there is custody, and arguably
there is interrogation, in both instances. While the point is not directly addressed, the apparent view of the majority is that the statements of the defendants fall within the spontaneous utterance exception. Id. at 923. See generally
J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED: ThIAL RIGHTS § 84 (1974). The
dissent likewise approached the case from the perspective of Brown alone.

147.

See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-604 (1975): "Examination required before

commitment.-No person can be committed to prison for any criminal matter,
until examination thereof be first had before some magistrate."
The dissent referred to "the explicit command of" the statute, a phrase

presumably carefully chosen since judicial interpretation has been to the contrary. The court has sustained confessions made during an incommunicado
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case as concerning not merely the admissibility of the statements
but more importantly the future conduct of law enforcement officials.
B.
1.

Search and Seizure
Incident to Arrest

Searches incident to arrest were limited in Chimel v.
California", to those necessary to prevent injury to the officer,
escape, and the destruction of evidence."m In United States v.
Robinson" and Gustafson v. Florida,'5 ' however, the Supreme
Court held that an object seized from the person of the arrestee
could thereafter be examined more intensively, notwithstanding
the elimination of the dangers cited in Chimel. In United States
v. Giles'52 the accused was arrested in his car as he was leaving a
parking lot. Incident to the arrest, the officer opened the trunk
of the vehicle and seized three pieces of luggage. Illegallypossessed narcotics were found in each bag. The Sixth Circuit
held the search legitimate under two theories.'5 ' First, the officers
had probable cause to believe the automobile contained contraband, and therefore the search could be sustained as a warrantless vehicular search.' Second, the search was a reasonable incident to the arrest under Robinson, which the court had determined in prior cases would sustain the search of a suitcase held
by the arrestee at the time of arrest.' 5
detention of three days, Wynn v. State, 181 Tenn. 325, 181 S.W.2d 332 (1944),
and two weeks, Van Zandt v. State, 218 Tenn. 187, 402 S.W.2d 130 (1966), prior
to an appearance before a magistrate. In the most recent case in which the court
addressed the issue, State ex rel. Reed v. Heer, 218 Tenn. 338, 403 S.W.2d 310
(1966), affirming a conviction in which the accused had been held two days prior
to commitment, the court rejected the construction suggested by the dissent,
concluding, "This statute does not require that a prisoner be taken immediately
before a committing magistrate, but merely prescribes what shall take place at
the time the prisoner is taken before the magistrate." Id. at 343, 403 S.W.2d at
313.
148. 345 U.S. 752 (1969).
149. See J. CooK, supra note 124, § 44.
150. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
151. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
152. 536 F.2d 136 (6th Cir. 1976).
153. Id. at 140.
154. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
155. United States v. Kaye, 492 F.2d 744 (6th Cir. 1974); United States
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The court saw "no qualitative difference between the search
of a suitcase seized by the police from the defendant himself, and
the search of a suitcase seized as the result of the lawful search
of defendant's automobile."'5 8 Presumably, this passage properly
places the case in the vehicle search category. Allusions by the
court to the search incident to arrest justification-are unnecessary
to the decision and clearly misleading. This may be seen by considering the possibility that there was no probable cause to believe the vehicle contained seizable property, and the trunk was
searched as incident to the arrest. Such a search would clearly be
beyond the parameters of Chimel and, unlike Robinson, the original seizure would likewise be outside the contemplation of
Chim el.
2. Open Fields
In 1924, the United States Supreme Court held in Hester v.
United States'7 that the protection of the fourth amendment was
inapplicable to seizures made in open fields.

51

Recent decisions

have with increasing frequency focused on the possibility that
Katz v. United States", modifies the Hester holding insofar as it
superimposes a reasonable expectation of privacy on all fourth
amendment analysis.""

In State v. Wert,"' pursuant to a tip from two informants,
officers entered the fifty-acre farm of the accused in search of
cultivated marijuana. The farm was enclosed by a fence except
for 400 feet on one side, which was bounded by woods. Entries
were made on three different days, leading to the discovery of two
marijuana patches not visible from the road. Initially, the court
rejected the stipulation of the parties that the term "possessions"
in the Tennessee constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures' was broader than the term "effects" in
the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. 13 Nevv. Burch, 471 F.2d 1314 (6th Cir. 1973).

156. 536 F.2d at 140,
157. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
158. See generally J. COOK, supra note 124, § 60.
159. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
160.
161.
162.
163.

See, e.g., Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1974).
550 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977).
TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
The court cited Sneed v. State, 221 Tenn. 6, 423 S.W.2d 857 (1967),
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ertheless, the court concluded that the Katz modification of
Hester rendered the search in this case a violation of both the
federal and state constitutions.'64
Judge Tatum, dissenting, found "nothing in Katz which indicates an intention by the United States Supreme Court to
tamper with the open fields doctrine.""'6 Citing a number of postKatz cases employing the doctrine, he concluded that the proper
standard was whether the area was "expectedly private according
to the common habits of mankind in general."1 " This would appear to be roughly equivalent to the requirement of an objective
reasonable expectation of privacy, the approach typically used in
Katz-type cases. Indeed, it is not at all clear that this test differs
from that used by the majority; it simply reached different conclusions on the application of the theory to the facts. Judge
Tatum contended that the focus of analysis should not be on the
expectations of marijuana farmers, who undoubtedly wish to keep
their activities private, but upon "a farmer raising corn, cotton
or hay [who] would not, according to the common habits of
mankind, object to his crops being viewed even if he had posted
signs or built fences.""' The credibility of this statement is certainly open to question. Assuming the corn, cotton, or hay are not
ambulatory, why else would the farmer erect a fence other than
for the notion that the federal and state provisions were "identical in intent and
purpose and the Court would not construe the Tennessee article more favorably
to the accused than its federal counterpart." 550 S.W.2d at 2. Actually, the
Sneed court said, "[A]s our constitutional provision, Article 1, § 7, is identical
in intent and purpose with the Fourth Amendment, it is reasonable that we
should not limit it more stringently than federal cases limit the Fourth Amendment . . . ." 221 Tenn. at 13, 423 S.W.2d at 860 (emphasis added). This did
not preclude a broader interpretation of the Tennessee provision.
164. The court relied on United States ex ret. Gedko v. Heer, 406 F. Supp.
609 (W.D. Wis. 1975). In Gedho, however, the officers engaged in visual and
auditory surveillance of conversations and activities of the accused and his wife
in marijuana propagation. The decision might therefore be distinguished from
Wert on the frequently quoted passage in Katz: "[Tlhe Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
165. 550 S.W.2d at 3. The dissent noted that in Katz the parties had
agreed that an open field was not a "protected area." 389 U.S. at 351 n.8. The
court, however, had no reason to consider the application of its holding to open
fields and specifically rejected the "protected areas" conceptualization of the
issue stipulated by the parties.
166. 550 S.W.2d at 7.
167. Id.
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to keep people or animals out? Why post "no trespassing" signs
other than to make this expectation unambiguous in terms of
"the common habits of mankind"? Furthermore, contrary to the
implication of the dissent, this case did not involve merely
"looking over the fence," in which instance the plain view doctrine would apply.
Suppose the accused had been using the secreted portion of
his farm to develop a new breed of corn. The location was selected, the fences were built, and the signs were posted, all for the
purpose of maintaining the secrecy of the agricultural experimentation. There could be little doubt that under these circumstances there is a reasonable expectation of privacy against trespassers on the land.
The flaw in the dissent is not in the conceptualization of the
issue but in the confusion of objective and subjective expectations
of privacy, both of which must be present for Katz to apply.
Whether the accused is growing marijuana, corn, or experimental
corn, from an objective standpoint, the case comes out the same:
a reasonable consideration (or "the common habits of mankind")
would lead to the conclusion that the activity was in privateM "
What makes Judge Tatum's example distinguishable is not. an
alteration of the objective conditions but the assumption that the
innocent farmer does not care if people come on his land to look
at his corn; that is, he has no subjective expectation of privacy.
Thus, if a fourth amendment protection is not implicitly claimed,
it will not be recognized. In Wert both objective and subjective
expectations of privacy were present, and therefore Katz controlled.
3. Abandoned Property
The application of the Katz standard to traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement also arises in the case of the
seizure of purportedly abandoned property. ' A particularly in168. Different considerations would come into play if air surveillance were
involved. See People v. Superior Court for County of Los Angeles, 37 Cal. App.
3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974); Dean v. Superior Court for County of Nevada,
35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973); People v, Sneed, 32 Cal. App.
3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973); State v. Gedko, 63 Wis. 2d 644, 218 N.W.2d

249 (1974),
169.

See generally J. COOK, supra note 124, § 48.
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teresting question has arisen respecting the warrantless search of
garbage containers. The first case to address the issue was a California decision, People v. Edwards,170 in which a neighbor reported to the police that he had observed a large plastic bag,
possibly containing marijuana, on the back porch of the accused's
residence. Officers went to the back yard of the residence and
examined the contents of trash cans a few feet from the back
porch. Inside one can they found a bag containing a small amount
of marijuana. The California Supreme Court, viewing the trash
cans as "an adjunct to the domestic economy," held the evidence
inadmissible: "Placing the marijuana in the trash can, so situated and used, was not an abandonment, unless as to persons
authorized to remove the receptacle's contents, such as trashmen
. . . The marijuana itself was not visible without 'rummaging'
in the receptacle."''
Two years later, the same court reviewed People v.Kriuda,'72
in which the officers had attempted to avoid the pitfalls of
Edwards. The officers requested sanitation workers to empty the
well of their garbage truck, after which the refuse from the accused's trash barrel was deposited into the truck and searched.
Again the court found the evidence inadmissible:
*

The fact that the officers did not examine the contents until the
trash had been placed into the well of the refuse truck does not
distinguish Edwards, for at no time did defendants' trash lose
its "identity" by being mixed and combined with the
"conglomeration" of trash previously placed in the truck.'73
On the other hand, in Smith v.State'74 the Supreme Court
of Alaska held that the accused could harbor no reasonable expectation of privacy in a dumpster commonly used by the occupants
170.
171.

71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
Id. at 1104, 458 P.2d at 718, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 638.

172. 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971).
173. Id. at 366-67, 486 P.2d at 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 68. The Krivda case
reached the United States Supreme Court, but the Court avoided the Katz issue
by remanding for a determination of whether or not the holding had been based
on an interpretation of the California as well as the United States Constitution.
409 U.S. 33 (1972).
On remand, the California Supreme Court held that it had relied on the
state constitution and thereby rendered the substantive holding immune to
federal review. 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973).
174. 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973).
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of several apartments. While not disagreeing with the California
precedents, the court noted three factors that it felt distinguished
this case: (1) the common use of the dumpster meant that any of
a number of people might from time to time "scavenge about in
the collective heap";' 5 (2) municipal pickups were made from the
dumpster, and thus a third group of persons could be expected
to look inside and possibly scavenge; 76' (3) the dumpster was in
the parking area, which made it accessible to others.
A recent Tennessee decision, Bolen v. State,' also involved
the warrantless search of a trash dumpster. Although not going
so far as to hold the dumpster constitutionally protected, the
court found an insufficient record to conclude that the contents
of the dumpster were abandoned property. It noted that the
dumpster was located on the accused's property, adjacent to a
private driveway, making it necessary for the searching party to
use a board to climb to the entry point on the dumpster. In
affirming the conviction, the court concluded that even if the
evidence were improperly admitted, the error was harmless.
4.

Exigent Circumstances

The requirement of a search warrant may be dispensed with
when immediate action is called for under exigent circumstances.' 71 In United States v. Guidry,' 71 the defendants had frequented an office supplier, and, because of the nature of their
requests, an employee of the supplier who suspected that they
were engaged in courterfeiting advised the Secret Service. A
check of utility service records by the Secret Service indicated
that electricity was being used at the house occupied by one of
175. Id. at 798. But see People v. Smith, 52 Cal. App. 3d 514, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 192 (1975) (communal trash receptacle of apartment building within the
ambit of fourth amendment protection).
176. How this distinguishes the case from other garbage cases is unclear.
Indeed, it might be argued that sanitation personnel are less likely to examine
the contents of a dumpster than the contents of a privately used garbage can.
Dumpsters are typically emptied with heavy machinery, without necessitating
personal contact with the contents. Furthermore, in the case of the dumpster,
the individual depositor is protected by the relative anonymity produced by the
conglomeration of his garbage with that of others.
177. 544 S.W.2d 918 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).
178. See generally J, COOK, supra note 124, § 49.
179. 534 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1976).
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the defendants in "excessive" quantities. The house was then
placed under surveillance. An agent, posed as a helper of a representative from the office equipment supplier, made a call at the
house, ostensibly to examine a printing press that the defendants
had indicated they wished to sell. The undercover agent removed
a sample piece of paper having green ink from the press and later
in the day returned in hopes of eliciting additional information
that might suggest counterfeiting. The agent felt that at least one
of the defendants had figured out his true identity, and within
fifteen minutes after his second departure a fire was started in a
carport at the house. The fire department was called, and a local
policeman, firemen, and federal officers all entered the house over
the objection of one of the defendants. A large quantity of counterfeit currency and equipment was seized.
The court held that the ruse used by the federal officer in
gaining the initial entry was legitimate police activity and therefore not violative of the fourth amendment.' 0 The court conceded
that this deception did not necessarily render lawful the seizure
of the piece of paper from the press but went no further into the
matter. As to the entry following the fire, the court found it reasonable to believe "that efforts to destroy evidence were in progress and would be likely to be completed absent prompt action
in entering the premises."'' If the entry were reasonable, then the
court felt that a pervasive search of the premises was justified for
the protection of the officers and to ensure that no one was destroying evidence in any part of the house. The evidence discovered in plain view in the course of such a search could be seized.
In United States v. Giles"2 an airline office in Detroit received a telex message that a described bag would be arriving on
a flight from Philadelphia. The bag had been opened inadvertently during loading and was observed to be filled with plastic
180. While the use of a ruse to accomplish entry to arrest or search has
been sustained, the officers in such cases have had a warrant or at least probable
cause. See J. COOK, supra note 124, at 81 n.5, 206 n.17. Such is not the case here,
nor does the court's citation of Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966), make
the argument any better. Lewis dispensed with the need for a warrant when "the
home is converted into a commercial center to which outsiders are invited for
purposes of transacting unlawful business." Id,at 211. See J. COOK, supra note
124, § 62. This exception certainly does not apply to the facts of this case,
181. 534 F.2d at 1223.
182. 536 F.2d 136 (6th Cir. 1976).
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bags of pills. This information was relayed to law enforcement
officers who met the bag when it arrived, searched it, and confirmed the report. One of the officers testified "that he was positive that the pills were narcotics because of their quantity, because they were unmarked, and because they were not commercially packaged,""' 3 The bag was returned to the baggage conveyor belt and ultimately claimed by the defendant, who was
thereafter arrested. ' The legitimacy of the search, which enabled officers to obtain probable cause to arrest, was challenged.
The court concluded that since the officers had but fifteen minutes notice of the arrival of the bag, the normal requirement of a
warrant could be excused because to hold otherwise "would result in losing the opportunity to apprehend the law violator.""'
Exigent circumstances may not, however, be an adequate
justification for a warrantless search if the officers have previously failed to take advantage of an opportunity to obtain a
warrant. In United States v.Chuke'l" federal officers determined
through information supplied by a reliable informant that the
accused was in possession of three or four guns, that he was a
convicted felon, that he was presently staying at a designated
motel with a named woman, and that he was driving a particularly described automobile. Pursuant to this information, the
motel room was placed under surveillance by both federal and
state narcotics agents. The court determined that by 3:00 a.m. of
the morning following the day the tip was received, the events
observed in the surveillance had sufficiently corroborated the tip
to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.
The warrantless arrest and search were not made until eight
hours later, after the accused had packed the car and was leaving
the parking lot.. It was undisputed that at this point there were
exigent circumstances supporting an immediate apprehension
and search. The court found, however, that the officers had
"squandered" an overt opportunity to obtain a warrant,' 7 and
therefore, in the absence of "compelling 'countervailing fac183. Id. at 138.
184. The validity of the search of defendant's car at the time of his arrest
is discussed at text accompanying notes 153-56 supra.
185. 536 F.2d at 139 (citing United States v. Birmley, 529 F.2d 103 (6th
Cir. 1976)).
186. 554 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1977).
187. Id.at 264.
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tors,' " the search was unreasonable.
Interestingly, at the time the court determined probable
cause had been established, a state narcotics agent had contacted
the local city attorney and had been advised that there was insufficient probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. No similar
effort had been made by the federal agents. The court held that
"if a defendant's allegation of deliberate bypass of a warrant is
supported by a finding that a realistic opportunity existed to
procure one . . . the Government must come forward with

objective evidence tending to justify this deviation from normal
police procedure.""' The case leaves unanswered the result if
federal officers had applied for a warrant at 3:00 a.m. and the
request had been erroneously denied. Assuming no additional
information was gained that would heighten the level of probable
cause and therefore give the officers reason to reappraise the situation, would the warrantless search be sustained if the officers
could present objective evidence of reasonableness? No protected
interest of substance would appear to have been violated, but the
court would be confronted with a larger policy question of countenancing the decision of law enforcement officers to act in contravention of a judgment, albeit incorrect, by a judicial officer."'
5. Consent
Two unusual issues regarding effectiveness of consent to
search arose in Hembree v. State," in which both parents and a
son were charged with homicide. Two searches of the home had
occurred, one pursuant to the valid consent of the mother and a
second pursuant to the consent of the son,"' when all three were
in custody. While cases are common in which the effective consent of a parent to the search of residential premises are sustained
irrespective of protests by the child, 2 it is usually held that the
child cannot effectively waive the rights of the parent.'93 The
Hembree court reached the same conclusion, at least when the
Id. at 263-64.
189. Cf. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (cannot disobey injunction and then seek judicial review).
190. 546 S.W.2d 235 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).
191, The age of the son did not appear in the record; the court noted only
"that he could not have been more than 18 years of age." Id. at 241.
192. See J. CooK, supra note 124, at 337 n.10.
193. Id. at 338 n.12.
188.
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parents "are equally accessible to give or withhold consent to

search." ' Second, the court held that while the mother had previously consented to the search of the residence in her presence,
"Itihis did not amount to a continuing consent for different

officers to make subsequent searches when she was not present." ' 5 This conclusion is consistent with the general rule that
exceptions to the warrant requirement are strictly construed, and
therefore a consent search must be limited to the terms of the
consenting party.'"
C.
1.

Right to Counsel
Effective Assistance

Ineffective assistance of counsel may be found when, due to
no fault of the attorney, zealous efforts to present the case for the
defendant have been frustrated by rulings of the trial court. In
Hembree v. State' 7 the court of criminal appeals held that ineffective assistance could result from a prolonged court session. The
court had convened at nine in the morning, and presentation of
the proof by the defendants did not begin until eight in the evening. Shortly before midnight, counsel for the defendants advised
the court that they were tired and could not effectively pursue the
defense. Nevertheless, the trial judge continued for another hour,
adjourning only after all the evidence had been heard. The court
found reversible error in the failure to adjourn at midnight once
counsel had given the court notice of their diminished effectiveness.1'9

While it is generally recognized that the prosecution has the
privilege of presenting the final closing argument,1 " an unusual
question was raised in Wallis v. State. ' At the conclusion of the
presentation of evidence, the trial judge inquired of counsel if
they wished to address the jury. The prosecutor replied affirma194. 546 S.W.2d at 241.
195, Id. at 242.
196. See J.CooK, supra note 124, at 331 n.16. But see Herron v.State, 3
Tenn. Crim. App. 39, 456 S.W.2d 873 (1970).
197. 546 S.W.2d 235 (Tenn.Crim. App. 1976).
198. Id. at 242. The decision was also based on the right to trial by jury.
See text accompanying notes 249-50 infra.

199.
200.

23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 983 (1961).
546 S.W.2d 244 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).
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tively and said that he would open; counsel for the defendant
apparently did not respond. The prosecution proceeded to present a brief, relatively innocuous argument, explaining to the jury
their duties and responsibilities. Defense counsel, choosing to
leave well enough alone, declined to present an argument. The
trial judge then announced that he intended to permit the prosecution to make an additional closing argument and that the
defense counsel should reconsider his decision. Counsel responded that he wanted an opportunity to rebut any jury argument, but the trial judge again advised that the defense would
not be permitted to argue to the jury later. The prosecutor then
"competently, effectively, scathingly, and specifically attacked
the appellant, his witness, and the defense theory."20 1 The request
by defense counsel to respond was denied.
In reversing the conviction, the court noted that while the
prosecution normally has the right to open and close the argument to the jury, "[i]f the defendant waives the right to respond
to the State's opening argument, then ordinarily the State should
have no right to present an additional argument. 20 2 The court
noted, however, that if defense counsel has indicated an intent to
make an argument before the prosecution begins its argument
and then waives the argument after prosecution presents the first
segment of its argument, the trial court may permit the prosecution to complete its argument 0 3 Only in exceptional cases should
the defense counsel be permitted to rebut the closing arguments
of the prosecutor, but the court concluded that this was such a
case. The critical point was that the prosecutor introduced "an
entirely new line of argument" following waiver by the defense.0
The scope of the holding is far from clear. Read literally, the
court could have meant that the prosecution may include nothing
in the final portion of its presentation that was not included in
the opening portion. The court noted that "[t]he error was further magnified" by the fact that the later presentation was "the
only real argument" made by the prosecution. 05 Conceivably the
201. Id. at 246.
202. Id. at 247.
203. Id. at 247-48. See also Myers v. State, 4 Tenn. Crim. App. 314, 470
S.W.2d 848 (1971).
204. 546 S.W.2d at 248.
205. Id. (citing Myers v. State, 4 Tenn. Crim. App. 314, 470 S.W.2d 848
(1971)).
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court is only concerned with cases such as this one, in which the
prosecution has said nothing requiring rebuttal in its initial presentation. Also left ambiguous by the holding is whether, in those
exceptional cases in which the defense is permitted a rebuttal, the
prosecution will still be permitted its traditional prerogative of
making the final argument.
2.

Pro Se Defense

The Supreme Court held in Faretta v. California' that an
accused had a constitutional right to present his own defense.
Lower federal courts have subsequently held that the right recognized in Faretta did not include a right to participate in the
presentation of the defense by counsel. 07 The Tennessee Constitution, however, provides that "the accused hath the right, to be
2 ' the
heard by himself and his counsel."210 In State v.Burkhart
court faced the issue of whether an accused, represented by counsel, could cross-examine witnesses and argue his own case. Citing
decisions from other jurisdictions with similar constitutional provisions,1 0 the court concluded that there was no such right. In
historical context the language of the provision was seen by the
court as recognizing the right of an accused to make an unsworn
statement in his own behalf and to be represented by counsel as
well. Today, the court said, the provision might be paraphrased,
"the accused has the right to testify as a witness in his own behalf
and to be represented by counsel."' Thus, under the Tennessee
Constitution, the accused does not have both the right to represent himself and to be represented by counsel. The trial judge
retains discretion in exceptional circumstances, however, to permit the accused to participate with counsel in the presentation
of the defense. 12
206.

422 U.S. 806 (1975).

207. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Hill, 526 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Swinton,
400 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
208. TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (emphasis added).
209. 541 S.W.2d 365 (Tenn. 1976).
210, Mosby v. State, 249 Ark. 17, 457 S.W.2d 836 (1970); Moore v. People,
171 Colo. 338, 467 P.2d 50 (1970); State v. Whitlow, 13 Or. App. 607, 510 P.2d
1354 (1973).
211. 541 S.W.2d at 371.
212. "ITihis discretion should be exercised sparingly and with caution

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

19771

D. Confessions
1. Use of Silence for Impeachment
The silence of the accused in the face of accusation may not
be used as evidence against him."' In Harrisv. New York,"' however, the United States Supreme Court held that statements obtained in violation of Miranda could be used to impeach inconsistent trial testimony. However, some courts have applied Harris
not only to inconsistent statements, but to inconsistent silence as
well."'1

In Minor v. Black"' defendant testified that he had been
home asleep at the time of the crime charged. When asked on
cross-examination why he had not given this alibi to the police
at the time of his arrest, he responded that he had remained silent
on the advice of counsel. This failure of defendant to give his alibi
to the police was emphasized in the prosecutor's argument to the
jury. The court held that the prosecutor's references to defendant's silence were constitutional error, because defendant's silence was not "sufficiently inconsistent with his trial testimony
to permit the use of that silence to impeach his testimony."2 7' The
court's suggestion of degrees of inconsistency is illogical. What
the court presumably meant was that, given the explanation of
defendant for his silence, there was no necessary inconsistency at
all.
A similar result was reached in Braden v. State,' the court
finding nothing "patently inconsistent" between trial testimony
and pretrial silence. If the silence is unambiguous, a different
result is possible. In Parks v. State,"' defendant was arrested for
murder. After receiving the Mirandawarnings, he told police that
he had shot the victim but refused further comment.2 At trial,
and only after a judicial determination that the defendant (1) is not seeking to

disrupt orderly trial procedure and (2) that the defendant has the intelligence,
ability and general competence to participate in his own defense." Id.
213.
214.

See J. CooK, supra note 146, § 86.
401 U.S. 222 (1971).

215. See J.

CooK,

supra note 146, at 366 n.45.

216.
217.
•218.
219.

527 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 3.
534 S.W.2d 657 (Tenn. 1976).
543 S.W.2d 855 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).

220.

The defendant had made the same statement prior to receiving the
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he claimed the shooting was accidental. The court sustained the
admission of testimony by the prosecution showing that after
making the admission, defendant chose to remain silent. The
court viewed the testimony as "a comment on the scope of defendant's statements and not a reference to the refusal of defendant
to make any statement at all.""'' While the court cited the impeachment cases, on closer scrutiny it appears to have held that
the use of the testimony did not violate Miranda at all.
2. Determination of Admissibility
The determination of the admissibility of a confession is always, in the first instance, a question of law to be resolved by the
trial judge. Under the orthodox view, the issue is not submitted
to the jury, although it does determine the weight to be given to
the confession. Under the Massachusetts rule, followed in a minority of jurisdictions, the jury is permitted to reconsider the
issue of voluntariness. 2 Tennessee has always followed the orthodox rule. 2 3 When properly used, the Massachusetts rule is more
favorable to the accused since it permits a consideration of voluntariness by two factfinders, either of whom can eliminate the
confession from consideration. Therefore, following the Massachusetts rule in a jurisdiction committed to the orthodox rule will
always be harmless error. In State u. Pursley,224 however, the
court held that the trial judge may not abdicate to the jury the
responsibility of making the initial determination of voluntariness. The substantive question of the admissibility of the confession was not addressed by the court. Granting the error of the trial
court, if in fact the confession were admissible, the error would
still appear to be harmless.2 25
E.

Guilty Pleas

1. Plea Bargaining
Plea bargaining has been acknowledged by the Supreme
Miranda warnings. This statement was found admissible as a spontaneous utterance.
221. 543 S.W.2d at 857.
222. See J. CooK, supra note 146, § 93.
223. See, e.g., Wynn v. State, 181 Tenn. 325, 181 S.W.2d 332 (1944).
224. 550 S.W.2d 949 (Tenn. 1977).
225. See generally id.at 953 (Fones, J., dissenting).
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Court as a constitutionally legitimate device for resolving criminal cases, 2 1 but little has been said regarding possible limitations
on the tactics employed in plea bargaining. Such an issue arose
in Hayes v. Cowan,"7 in which, during plea bargaining, the prosecution threatened to bring a habitual offender charge against the
accused in the event he refused to plead guilty to the pending
charge of forgery. While finding no clear constitutional mandate,
the court identified some closely related problems that suggested
22 the United States
impropriety. In North Carolina u.Pearce,
Supreme Court held that following the reversal of a conviction,
as a matter of due process the accused could not be given greater
punishment on retrial, unless justified by events occurring subsequent to the first conviction. The Pearce rule was applied to
vindictiveness in the exercise of a prosecutor's discretion in
Blackledge u. Perry."' Following conviction for a misdemeanor,
the defendant in Hayes had sought a trial de novo in a higher
court, whereupon the prosecution obtained a felony indictment
based on the same conduct. Just as in Pearce, the court found an
impermissible penalty imposed upon defendant for exercising his
right of appeal; here the tactic improperly deterred the use of a
procedural right to a trial de novo. The court in Hayes found "a
similar potential for impermissible vindictiveness."", The court
rejected the argument of the prosecution that the concept of plea
bargaining would be destroyed if more serious charges could not
be brought when defendants refused to plead guilty. To preserve
its options, the prosecution should obtain an indictment for the
most serious charge that the facts will support at the outset.2 '
226. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
227. 547 F.2d 42 (6th Cir. 1976).
228. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
229. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
230. 547 F.2d at 44 (discussing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974)).
See generally United States v. Butler, 414 F. Supp. 394 (D. Conn. 1976); see also
United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1976).
231. A more difficult question is raised when the parties agree to a plea
to a charge that is less than that included in the indictment, and thereafter the
guilty plea is invalidated. Should the prosecution be permitted to charge the
accused with any greater offense or seek any greater punishment than that
which was included in the plea bargain? See United States v. Anderson, 514
F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1975) (charge of greater offense permissible); ef, United States
v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170 (4th Cir. 1976) (additional charges impermissible if
not included in original indictment); McGlothlin v. State, 521 SW.2d 51 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1975) (prosecution limited to offenses included in plea bargain).
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Waiver of Rights

A plea of guilty is generally recognized to waive all rights,
constitutional or otherwise, that may have existed prior to entering the plea. 2 Courts have held, however, that the accused may
always raise the constitutionality of the statute defining the offense for which he was convicted.21 3 A recent Tennessee decision
has held that the accused may even waive this right. In Capri
Adult Cinema v. State 3' defendants entered a plea of guilty to
an obscenity charge, for which they received fines, which were
paid, and a suspended jail sentence. Two weeks prior to the entry
of the pleas, defendants had sought a continuance, alleging that
the constitutionality of the obscenity statute was at that time
under consideration by the state supreme court, The motion was
twice denied, and an order, entered on the same day that final
judgment was entered, specified that "the Defendants expressly
waive all constitutional provisions."' 13 Over a month later, the
obscenity statute was declared unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad .2 3 Defendants thereafter sought a writ of error for the
vacation of their guilty pleas and restitution of the fine paid. The
court of criminal appeals held that defendants had waived the
right to appellate review, and the supreme court agreed, finding
that defendants had "deliberately and knowingly dealt with the
State on the strength of a statute whose constitutionality was
being challenged, and accepted the benefits of the plea bargaining," '37 which included the dismissal of six of seven indictments,
suspended jail sentences, and reduced fines.
The court distinguished cases in which the defense had unsuccessfully raised the issue of constitutionality before the trial
judge. It analogized the principle in civil litigation "that when
parties have dealt with each other at arms' length upon the basis
of an unconstitutional statute, they are bound by the results of
2
their actions.""
More in point is Moore v. Lawrence County23' in
232. See J. COOK, supra note 124, § 113.
233. Id. at 552 n,20.1 (Cum. Supp.).
234. 537 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1976).
235. Id. at 898.
236. Art Theatre Guild, Inc. v. State ex rel. Rhodes, 510 S.W.2d 258
(Tenn. 1974).
237. 537 S.W.2d at 899.
238. Id. (citing Roberts v. Roane County, 160 Tenn. 109, 23 S.W.2d 239
(1929)).
239. 190 Tenn. 451, 230 S.W.2d 666 (1950).
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which defendant had paid a criminal fine after pleading guilty in
a general sessions-court and years later attempted to recover the
fine, claiming the court had lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.
The court denied relief on the grounds that, assuming the general
sessions court acted illegally, defendant "was a willing party to
the illegality."' 240
The court also cited United States v. Gettinger,4 ' in which
defendants had entered nolo contendere pleas waiving all challenges "to any and all fines which the court may see fit to impose
upon me upon such plea, except in the event that the so-called
Lever Act under which said indictment is founded shall be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United
'
States."2 42
Several months thereafter, the Supreme Court did
declare the Act unconstitutional, but the Court held that defendants were not entitled to the return of their fines." '
Presumably, the holding in Capri Adult Cinema, as well as
in Moore and Gettinger, is limited to the recovery of a fine that
has been fully paid. Certainly a guilty plea, with or without the
waiver found in Capri Adult Cinema, should not prevent the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of a person incarcerated under the authority of a statute declared unconstitutional. 2"
Nor should it be supposed that one would be required to pay any
portion of a fine unpaid at the time the statute was invalidated.
The distinction would appear to be whether or not the judgment
has been fully executed.
In Capri Adult Cinema, however, there was also the matter
of a criminal conviction from which defendants wished to be exonerated.2 5 The court suggested that defendants might have been
2
successful had they filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis 4
240.
241.
242.

Id. at 454, 230 S.W.2d at 668.
272 U.S. 734 (1927).
Id. at 735.

243. "[N]o contract arose . . .which obligated the United States to return the fine. Neither the court nor any federal officer bad authority to make
such an agreement." Id,
244, The Tennessee post-conviction relief act would apply. TENN, CODE
ANN, § 40-3802 (1975).
245. The court indicated that the defendants sought a "reversal of their
guilty plea," presumably accompanied by a dismissal of the charges. 537 SW.2d
at 898.

246.

See

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 40-3411 (1975).

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

IV&l 45

instead of a writ of error. Even this, however, would be unavailable if the statute were not declared unconstitutional until more
than a year after .judgment had been entered. Another statute
gives discretionary authority to release defendants from fines for
good cause, but the judgment apparently would not be affected. "'
Justice Henry, dissenting, considered the convictions void ab
initio and the resulting punishments therefore invalid. He saw no
reason the court could not order the remission of the fines paid.24
F.

Fair Trial

1. Trial by Jury
The right to trial by jury encompasses the expectation that
jurors will be permitted to carry out their responsibilities as effectively as possible. In Hembree v. State,"' court had been convened at nine in the morning, and the trial continued all day and
into the evening. Shortly before midnight defense counsel requested an adjournment, which was denied, and the proceedings
continued until one in the morning. At that time all the evidence
had been heard, and the court adjourned until nine the same
morning. The court held that the resulting conviction had been
obtained through a denial of due process because of the likely
fatigue of counsel, witnesses, and the jury.250
Jury service by women is optional in Tennessee by virtue of
statute.' In Scharff u. State5 ' this provision was attacked as an
unconstitutional deprivation of the right to trial by jury under the
sixth amendment, as delineated in Taylor v. Louisiana.5 ' The
statute involved in Taylor provided that no woman would be
called for jury service unless she had filed a written declaration
of her desire to serve. The Tennessee provision, on the other hand,
247. Id. § 40-3202; see 537 S.W.2d at 901.
248. "The conclusion the majority reaches sacrifices justice upon the altar
of procedural technicalities, and condones unjust enrichment under a void law,
contrary to the dignity of the state and to the detriment of the essential requirements of perfect justice." 537 S.W.2d at 904.
249. 546 S.W.2d 235 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).
25(0. The court also found a deprivation of effective assistance of counsel.
See text accompanying notes 197-98 supra.
251. TENN. COLDE ANN. §§ 22-101, -108 (Supp. 1976).
252. 551 S.W.2d 671 (Tenn. 1977).
253. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
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gave women the privilege of declining to serve when summoned.
The court read the Taylor decision as rendering exemption statutes unconstitutional only if they "produce criminal jury venires
that are almost totally male.""' It found the record insufficient
in the present case to reach a decision on the merits, although
there was strong suggestion that the statute was constitutionally
vulnerable. Justice Henry, in a vociferous concurring opinion,
submitted that it was time for the court "to stop whispering and
whistling . . . and to say flatfootedly that these Code provisions
are unconstitutional." 55
2.

Appearance of Accused

Two decisions of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
found no denial of due process in trying the accused while he is
dressed in prison garb. In Carroll v. State25 the court held that
any right to be tried in civilian clothing may be waived in absence
of a timely assertion. Furthermore, the error would be harmless
if the jury were otherwise aware of the convict status of the accused. 5 7 The latter point appeared controlling in Chisom u.
State,5 in which the defendant was on trial for escape from a
penitentiary.
The United States Supreme Court held in Estelle v.
Williams,25' shortly after the decisions in Carroll and Chisom were
254. 551 S.W.2d at 675.
255. Id.at 676. "These statutes are a throwback to the now wholly discredited belief that 'a woman's place is in the home.' This is but a subtle form of
antifeminism under which women are denied a portion of their rights as citizens." Id. at 677.
256. 532 S.W.2d 934 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).
257. It is difficult to conceive why itshould be strange or prejudicial for a jury to observe an individual who has been arrested, charged,
and in custody for a criminal offense, to be attired in jail clothing when
it is no more than common sense that he is either in custody or on bond
for the offense for which he is presented for trial.
Id. at 936-37. This explanation would appear broad enough to cover virtually
all criminal cases. The court would appear oblivious to the subliminal influence
of the constant reminder that the person before the jury is a convict. Itis for
the purpose of inducing quite the opposite impression that judges wear robes.

See J.FRANK,
258.
259.

COURTS ON TRIAL

254-61 (1949).

539 S.W.2d 831 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).
425 U.S. 501 (1976).
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rendered," that while a state could not, consistent with the rights
of due process and equal protection, compel an accused to stand
trial in prison garb, the failure to make an objection to the trial
court was "sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation. ' '2 . The holding is a
vindication of the Carroll decision. In Chisom, defense counsel
had requested on the day of trial that the defendant be tried in
street clothes. The Estel/e case did not address the possibility of
harmless error.
When the accused is to be tried while in shackles, greater
sensitivity is shown for the possibility of prejudice. In Willocks v.
State2" ' the court of criminal appeals acknowledged that physical
restraint of the defendant may at times be appropriate and necessary in light of the constitutional right to be present at one's
trial.' 3 The fact that another person, unrelated to the defendant,
had jumped out a window in the courtroom on the previous day,
as was the case in Wilocks, was an insufficient justification for
restraining defendant.
3. Jury Argument
While substantial latitude is permitted counsel in argument
to the jury, the argument nevertheless "must be temperate, must
be predicated on the evidence introduced during the trial of the
case, and must be pertinent to the issue being tried." '' In Russell
v. State"' the Tennessee Supreme Court found an abuse of discretion in permitting the prosecutor in closing argument to raise
"the spectre of conspiracy, deceit and worse on the part of psychiatrists, psychologists, and attorneys.""' Similarly, in Brazelton v.
State,"" in which two defendants were charged with possessing
obscene materials for the purpose of sale, the prosecution injecte
a false issue into the case by frequent allusion to a phantom
260.
certiorari
261.
262.
26:3.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Estelle was decided before the Supreme Court of Tennessee denied
in Chisom.
425 U.S. at 513.
546 S.W.2d 819 (Tenn. Crim. App, 1976).
See Illinois v, Allen, 397 U,S. 337 (1970).
Russell v. State, 532 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tenn. 1976).
532 S.W.2d 268 (Tenn. 1976).
id. at 271.
550 S.W,2d 7 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974),
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defendant corporation that employed the defendants, although
there was no corporate defendant. In order to persuade the jury
to impose a stiff fine, the prosecutor made such statements as,
"I am asking you to shoot the overhead of that corporation up
about fifteen thousand dollars." ' In fact, the jury found each of
the defendants guilty on three counts and imposed fines totaling
$30,000.211 The court found the argument improper and concluded
that the error went beyond the question of punishment, "as a
desire to punish the nonparty corporation could have influenced
the finding of guilt itself."70
Although the prosecution is traditionally entitled to open
and close argument to the jury, in Wallis v. State ' the court held
that the prosecution may not deprive the defendant of the opportunity to rebut by saving the substantive thrust of its argument
for the close."
G.

Punishment

1. Probation
The power to grant or deny probation in Tennessee is by
statute left to the "sole discretion of the trial judge."2 " Notwithstanding the language used, the power is not absolute,2' and both
the prosecution and the defense may seek appellate review of the
determination."' A denial of probation will be overturned only if
"capricious, arbitrary or palpably abusive of his discretion."r' In
Mattino v. State"' the court found an abuse of discretion in denying probation either solely on the basis of the nature of the offense
or because the defendant had pleaded guilty to a lesser offense
when the evidence elicited at the sentencing hearing was uni268. Id. at 9.
269. The prosecution conceded on appeal that the three counts embraced
but a single offense and sought affirmance of fines of five thousand dollars
against each defendant.
270. 550 S.W.2d at 10.
271. 546 S.W.2d 244 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).
272. This holding is more thoroughly discussed in the context of effective
assistance of counsel. See text accompanying notes 200-04 supra.
273. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 40-2904 (1975).
274. Hooper v. State, 201 Tenn. 156, 297 S.W.2d 78 (1956).
275. Stiller v. State, 516 S.W.2d 617 (Tenn. 1974).
276. Id. at 620.
277. 539 S.W.2d 824 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).
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formly favorable to the defendant. Mattino relied upon language
in Stiller v. State2 that characterized probation as "a privilege
to be conferred after a determination of the circumstances of the
offense, the defendant's criminal record, his social history, his
present condition and, where appropriate, his physical and mental condition."2 5 The court concluded that the consideration in
the present case was too limited. " " Moreover, to deny probation
because the defendant pleaded guilty to a lesser charge would
significantly compromise the efficacy of the plea bargaining process. " ' The court further suggested that it would be highly advisable for the record to indicate explicitly that the trial judge considered any probation reports ordered pursuant to the statute. In
remanding the case for "further orders not inconsistent with this
opinion," 2 there would appear to be little question, absent evidence of intervening factors, that the court was mandating proba3
tion for the defendant?
2.

Death Penalty

In Collins v. State," under the authority of Woodson v.
North Carolina ' and Roberts u. Louisiana,"' the Tennessee
278. 516 S.W.2d 617 (Tenn. 1974).
279. Id. at 620. See also Franks v. State, 543 S.W.2d 613 (Tenn. 1976).
280. The court quoted with approval guidelines adopted in State v. Cornwall, 95 Idaho 680, 683, 518 P.2d 863, 866 (1974):
The trial court must consider the following in arriving at its decision:
(1) all the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense of which the
applicant is convicted; (2) whether the applicant is a first offender; (3)
the previous actions and character of the applicant; (4) whether the
applicant might reasonably be expected to be rehabilitated; (5)
whether it reasonably appears that the applicant will abide by the
terms of the probation, and; (6) the interests of society in being protected from possible future criminal conduct of the applicant.
281. "To suggest, as does the court below, that ... use (of plea bargaining] should preclude subsequent probation can only frustrate both the effectiveness of plea bargaining for the prosecution and the possibility of rehabilitation
of the defendant by supervised probation programs." Mattino v. State, 539
S.W.2d 824, 829 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).
282. Id. at 830.
283, "Upon remand the trial judge may fashion and impose whatever
conditions he 'may deem fit and proper.' " Id Judge Walker dissented, finding
insufficient proof of an abuse of discretion. Id. at 830-31.
284. 550 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. 1977).

285.

428 U.S. 280 (1976),

286.

428 US. :325 (1976).
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mandatory death penalty statute'"' was held unconstitutional. In
those instances in which it is determined that the death penalty
cannot be carried out validly, the court held that the case must
be remanded for resentencing. The fact that the sentence would
be fixed by a jury different from the one that determined guilt
was not objectionable'
Subsequent to the decision in Collins, the governor commuted defendants' death sentences to life imprisonment. On petition to rehear brought by the state, the court held that in light
of the commutation, remand of the case would be unnecessary.
Justice Henry, in a concurring and dissenting opinion following
the original judgment, had argued that either the court should
reduce the sentence to life imprisonment or certify to the governor
the extenuating circumstances to permit commutation."" He concurred in the decision on rehearing, acknowledging that the sentences of these defendants were all that was before the court.
Justice Brock dissented, however, concluding that the court
lacked authority to reduce a sentence to the maximum allowed
by statute. Furthermore, he submitted that the commutation by
the governor was "premature and unauthorized by law, and
constitute[d] an unwarranted interference with the judicial process" O" because the sentences were undetermined at the time of
the commutation.
3.

Determination of Sentence

Trial judges are required by statute to charge juries regarding
certain aspects of parole eligibility."' In Farris v. State' 2 this
portion of the statute was held unconstitutional, first, for failure
to satisfy the requirement of the state constitution" ' that all acts
modifying prior laws "shall recite in their caption or otherwise the
287.
288.

TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2405 to 2406 (1975).
550 S.W.2d at 647.
Id. at 648-49; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3506 (1975).

289.
290. 550 S.W.2d at 654. If the commutation occurred prior to the invalidation of the sentence, there would appear to be no basis for complaint in light of
Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
291. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2707 (1975).
292. 535 S.W.2d 608 (Tenn. 1976).
293.

TENN. CONST. art, 2, § 17.
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title or substance of the law repealed, revived or amended,"' 924
and, second, for being impermissibly vague. ' The Farris holding,
as a prohibition against such instructions, has been held applicable to all cases in which the conviction had not become final prior
21
to the decision in Farris. 1
In Gray v. State"7 the court established standards for the
imposition of consecutive sentences following conviction for multiple offenses."' The court rejected the suggestion that the controlling factor should be whether the offenses were part of the
same criminal episode. Rather, "a consecutive sentence should be
imposed only after a finding by the trial judge that confinement
for such a term is necessary in order to protect the public from
further criminal conduct by the defendant." ' The court delineated five categories of offenders with respect to whom consecutive
sentences would be permissible: (1) the persistent offender"one who has previously been convicted of two felonies or of
one felony and two misdemeanors committed at different times
when he was over eighteen (18) years of age"; " ' (2) the professional criminal-"one who has knowingly devoted himself to
criminal acts as a major source of livelihood or has substantial
income or resources not shown to be derived from a source other
294. Id. The caption of the act contained no reference to the requirement
that juries be charged on parole considerations.
295. Jurors of reasonable or common understanding and intelligence
are not capable of understanding the various ramifications of the parole system. We submit that there are few practicing attorneys, otherwise knowledgeable in criminal law, or judges at any level, who have
a complete understanding of these matters. Only the Records Clerk at
the state penitentiary, and the convict population are knowledgeable
in this highly specialized area. The law is a paradox on its face. When
the statutes involved are read they serve only to suggest that at some
future date the defendant will be the beneficiary of a parole. This law
proceeds upon the assumption that jurors, in a necessarily brief charge,
can be made to understand a law that is notoriously complex.
535 S.W.2d at 613.
296. Adams v. State, 547 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. 1977).
297, 538 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. 1976).
298. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2711 (1975) permits the imposition of consecutive sentences, "provided, that the exercise of discretion of the trial judge shall
be reviewable by the Supreme Court on appeal."
299. 538 S.W.2d at 393.

300,. Id
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than criminal activity";-" ' (3) the multiple offender; (4) the dangerous mentally abnormal person-one whose "criminal conduct
has been characterized by a pattern of repetitive or compulsive
behavior or by persistent aggressive behavior with heedless indifference to consequences";"2 and (5) the dangerous offender-one
whose criminal behavior indicates "that he has little or no regard
for human life, and no hesitation about committing a crime in
which the risk to human life is high. ' ' 01
Punishment may be increased under the habitual criminal
statute 4 by proof of conviction of three prior felonies. In Cra[ton
v. State 5 the court held it was not necessary that the prior convictions be in Tennessee.
H. Double Jeopardy
1. When Jeopardy Attaches
When a defendant is tried by a jury, jeopardy is said to
attach when the jury is sworn.' In State v. Daniels"7 the court
articulated for the first time the precise moment when jeopardy
attaches in a nonjury trial:
[Jleopardy attaches in a nonjury trial when a defendant is
placed on trial (1) on an indictment, presentment (or other
charging instrument), (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) before a competent judge who is present and ready to
sit as a trier of the facts, (4) after a valid waiver is executed by
the defendant, (5) after the entry of his plea, and (6) after the
witnesses are sworn, whether they be sworn singly or in a
0
,

group.

If these conditions are satisfied, it is not necessary for any testimony to have been heard in order for jeopardy to attach.
301.
302.
303.

Id.
Id.
Id.

304.

TENN. CODE ANN.

305.
306.
307.
308.

545 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
531 S.W.2d 795 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).
Id. at 801.

§ 40-2801 (1975).
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Multiple Offenses

Both federal ' ' and state' 1' courts in Tennessee have adhered
to the "same evidence" test in determining the validity of multiple charges." Thus, in State v. Briggs," " the court held that an
accused could be convicted of both felony murder and the underlying felony, overruling a prior decision to the contrary. ' Addressing the same issue in a different context, the court in Petree
v. State"' held that the elements of larceny were not included in
the offense of burglary, and therefore a defendant charged with
burglary was not entitled to an instruction on larceny or attempted larceny as a lesser-included offense. Similarly, an accused may be charged with both a substantive offense and conspiracy to commit that offense unless both are proved by the
same evidence. ' If an offense is of a continuing nature, it may
not be fragmented as a means of multiplying charges.1
In State u. Campbell3" the Tennessee Supreme Court considered whether the sale in a single transaction of two separately
classified controlled substances, mixed together, could be prosecuted as two separate offenses under the Drug Control Act.3 ' The
court of criminal appeals, relying on Wells v. State,""' had held
that only the conviction for the greater offense could stand because there was only a single sale of mixed controlled substances.
In Wells, the court had held that simultaneous possession of more
than one class of controlled substance, not acquired by separate
acts, could lead to but a single conviction.
Subsequent to Wells, however, the supreme court had rejected the "same transaction" test for determining the identity
of offenses in State v. Black.'" There the court had sustained
309. United States v. Gardner, 529 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1976).
310. State v. Briggs, 533 S.W.2d 290 (Tenn. 1976).
311. Multiple charges are appropriate as long as each charge requires
proof of facts that the others do not.
312. 533 S.W.2d 290 (Tenn. 1976).
313. Acres v. State, 484 S.W.2d 534 (Tenn. 1972).
314. 530 S.W.2d 90 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).
315. United States v. Austin, 529 F.2d 559 (6th Cir. 1976).
316. United States v. Jones, 533 F.2d 1387 (6th Cir. 1976).
317. 549 S.W.2d 952 (Tenn. 1977).
318. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 52-1408 to 1448 (1977).
319. 509 S.W.2d 520 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973), a/Pd, 517 S.W.2d 755
(Tenn. 1974).
320. 524 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. 1975).
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convictions of armed robbery and assault with intent to kill arising out of the same transaction. Eschewing a categorical rule, the
court held that "each case requires close and careful analysis of
the offenses involved, the statutory definitions of the crimes, the
legislative intent and the particular facts and circumstances."'
Black presented a relatively simple case since robbery and
assault were separate common-law offenses. In Campbell,
whether separate charges were authorized for multiple violations
of the Drug Control Act was deemed a matter of legislative intent.
The court's consideration of legislative intent, however, is contained in a single conclusory sentence. 22' Following the analysis
of Black, the Campbell court concluded that "the sale may be
sectored by acknowledging that two different schedule substances
were sold, each of which has been, by statute, separately classified and penalized by separate subsections of the general prohibitory statute.1 2 3 The court overruled Wells, but there was no inti-

mation in the opinion as to when "sectoring" would be improper.
3. Binding Cases to Higher Courts
The jurisdiction of general sessions courts extends to all misdemeanors but does not permit the imposition of a fine in excess
of fifty dollars by such courts. 24 If the general sessions judge
believes the offense merits a higher fine, the accused should be
bound to the circuit or criminal court." 5 In Seiber v. State"2 the
court held that once jeopardy had attached in the general sessions
court, a subsequent trial in the circuit or criminal court violated
the protection against double jeopardy,2 To avoid this difficulty,
321. Id. at 919.
322. "Considering the statutory scheme and legislative history of the Tennessee Drug Control Act, we are convinced that our legislature intended that a
sale of two or more controlled substances, classified separately in the schedules
of the Act, should constitute separate and distinct offenses." State v. Campbell,
549 S.W.2d 952, 956 (Tenn. 1977).
323. Id. at 955. The court cited Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958),
wherein a single narcotics transaction sustained convictions for three offenses,
all defined in the same federal statute.
324. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-118 (1975).
325. Id. § 40-416.
326. 542 S.W.2d 381 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).
327. The court followed Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), which involved the same issue in connection with a transfer from a juvenile court to a
criminal court,
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the court recommended that the general sessions judge conduct
an informal pretrial hearing in order to make an evaluation of the
magnitude of the offense without jeopardy attaching. In Seiber
jeopardy had attached with the presentation of evidence in the
general sessions court, but the proceeding was aborted prior to
judgment. The court saw no alternative to a dismissal of the
charges. :"
4.

Retrial Following Mistrial

In Wallace v. Havener"' the jury reached undisclosed verdicts on charges of shooting with intent to kill and illegal possession of a firearm but, was unable to reach a verdict on a charge of
armed robbery. The trial court, however, declared a mistrial on
all counts. On appeal, the court held that while there was a manifest necessity to declare a mistrial insofar as the armed robbery
charge was concerned, it was an abuse of discretion not to accept
the verdicts upon which the jury had agreed, and therefore retrial
on these charges was barred.
5.

Suppression of Evidence Following Conviction

Although not originating in Tennessee, a recent Supreme
Court decision may have important consequences. In United
States v.Morrison,' " ' the accused was found guilty of possession
of marijuana with intent to distribute. Defendant had been arrested after a warrantless search of his car by border patrol agents
at an immigration check point. Shortly after defendant was convicted, the Supreme Court, in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States," ' held that, warrantless roving patrol searches conducted
without probable cause violated the fourth amendment. The
Tenth Circuit subsequently applied Almeida-Sanchez retroactively and extended its holding to include searches at fixed checkpoints.3 2 The trial court in Morrison thereupon granted the pre328. "The State argues that the case should be remanded to the Trial
,Justice Court for reinstatement there. But this result would put the defendants
in triple jeopardy and is clearly inappropriate." 542 S.W.2d at 386.
329. 552 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1977).
330. 429 U.S. 1 (1976).
131. 413 U.S. 266 (1973),
332. United States v. Maddox, 485 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1973); United
States v. King, 485 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1973). The Court held otherwise in Bowen
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viously denied motion of the defendant to suppress the marijuana. The prosecution then sought to appeal the suppression
order, but the court of appeals dismissed the appeal, believing
that retrial would be barred by the double jeopardy clause. The
United States Supreme Court held that ruling to be in error because, under the authority of United States v. Wilson, '," if the
prosecution were to prevail on appeal, the judgment of conviction
would merely be reinstated."' Therefore retrial would be unnecessary in any event.
6.

Dismissal Following Mistrial

When the prosecution seeks to retry a defendant following
the declaration of a mistrial, the controlling standard for double
jeopardy purposes is whether the granting of the mistrial was a
"manifest necessity."3 5 Such necessity will frequently be found
when the jurors are unable to reach an agreement. '6 The question
was complicated in United States v.Sanford '7 by the fact that
following defendant's trial, which had ended in a hung jury and
the declaration of a mistrial, the charges were dismissed on the
ground that the government had consented to the activities upon
which the indictment was based. An appeal of this ruling by the
prosecution was dismissed on the belief that a retrial would be
barred by the protection against double jeopardy. The Supreme
Court disagreed, noting that had a second trial followed the first
without the intervening dismissal, the retrial would unquestionv. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975), and United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531
(1975).
333. 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
334. (Tlhe District Court's general finding of guilt here is for
double jeopardy purposes the same as a jury verdict of guilty. The
Government is therefore entitled to appeal the order suppressing the
evidence, since success on that appeal would result in the reinstatement of the general finding of guilt, rather than in further factual
proceedings relating to guilt or innocence. As in Wilson, there would
then remain only the imposition of sentence and the entry of a judgment of conviction ....
United States v. Morrison, 429 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1976).
335. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 194 (1824).
336. See J. COOK, CONSTITUTiONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED: POST-TIAL
RIGHTS § 58 (1976).
337. 429 U.S. 14 (1976).
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ably have been proper under the manifest necessity standard.
The issue was similar to that raised in Serfass u. United States,"l
in which the court held that a dismissal prior to trial did not
preclude an appeal for reasons of double jeopardy.
3,3'8.

420 U.S. 377 (1975).

